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INFORMAL MINUTES OF MEETING OF DIRECTOR AND CONSULTANTS  
INTERDEPARTMENTAL FOREIGN INFORMATION ORGANIZATION  
IN HOME OF DIRECTOR - DECEMBER 5, 1950

PRESENT: Department of State - Mr. Barrett, Director  
Mr. Oechsner, Acting Executive Secretary  
Mr. Reed Harris  
Mr. Oren Stephens  
Department of Defense - General Magruder  
Department of the Army - General McClure  
Joint Chiefs of Staff - Admiral Stevens  
Economic Cooperation Administration - Mr. Berding  
Central Intelligence Agency - Mr. Wisner  
National Security Resources Board - Mr. Sheppard

Mr. Barrett made the following announcements:

1. That, partly as a result of the Board's stimulation, the White House had sent out a memorandum regarding closer coordination of speeches by high officials of the government, as well as their replies to questions at press conferences.
2. The proposal for a visit by General Eisenhower to Western Europe had been advanced.
3. State Department studies of the defector problem had been stimulated.
4. A team of three experts, [redacted] had returned from a survey trip to Germany; copies of their report would be distributed to members of the Board.

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There was further general discussion of the defector problem, centering on the question of whether the U.S. should try to induce mass defection, and the U.S. and Russian positions on the "return of defectors" policy which Admiral Stevens noted had been negotiated at Yalta. At the conclusion of the discussion it was agreed that Mr. Barrett would take steps to see whether production by the State Department of a white paper on defectors was feasible. Such a white paper would trace the development of the whole handling of defectors and displaced persons, including the way Russia had violated the agreements reached at Yalta and elsewhere.

It was also agreed that Mr. Barrett would re-emphasize the desirability of an early report by the interdepartmental Ad Hoc Committee studying the overall problem of defectors.

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State Department review completed

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Mr. Barrett called upon General Magruder for his estimate of the current situation with respect to Chinese intervention in Korea. General Magruder replied that it was far from clear what the Chinese were up to and that he, personally, had the feeling that we still have the possibility of doing something with the Chinese, that they were not working within the framework of a Soviet plan, and were not actually anti-U.S. He felt that we should continue intensely our efforts to influence the Chinese by propaganda and other psychological means.

Mr. Wisner asked whether we were devoting appropriate attention to Chinese groups in this country. This led to general discussion of the question of governmental and non-governmental efforts to influence foreign nationality groups in this country.

The Acting Executive Secretary reported that he had an appointment the next day with Mr. McCordick of the Canadian Ministry of External Affairs on the subject of U.S. propaganda and psychological warfare, and requested instructions as to how far he should go in disclosures. It was agreed nothing should be imparted about the state of psychological warfare planning for wartime, in view of the lack of agreements, but that it was in order to discuss other matters with him of a classification up to and including confidential.

Mr. Berding returned to the question of the suggested Eisenhower visit to Europe and asked what its status was. General McClure indicated that there was some question as to the advisability of the visit among planning officials in Defense. Mr. Barrett pointed out that the original purpose of the proposed visit was to bolster morale in Western Europe, and inspire confidence, not so much among the governments of Western Europe as among the people. In this sense he felt that General Eisenhower had a considerable symbolic importance.

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Mr. Barrett brought up the following matters:

1. The question of terminology in characterizing the Russians in speeches and general propaganda output.
2. The question of how to handle in propaganda output to Europe news about U.S. defensive preparations, with particular reference to the problem of whether such news would serve to reassure European populations or give them the fear that we were preparing for war.

Following a general discussion, it was agreed that in any event "the less said about the A Bomb, the better."

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